Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions that consist of multiple divisions. Institutions fill their divisions sequentially, and each division is endowed with a sub-choice rule that satisfies classical substitutability and size monotonicity in conjunction with a new property that we introduce, quota monotonicity. We allow rich interactions between divisions in the form of capacity transfers. The overall choice rule of an institution is defined as the union of the sub-choices of its divisions. The cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with respect to GLCR is the unique stable and strategyproof mechanism. We define a choice-based improvement notion and show that the COM respects improvements. We employ the theory developed in this paper in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints.
Introduction
Many real-life problems involve matching agents to institutions that are composed of divisions such as firms, hospitals, or schools. These divisions are endowed with their own choice rules. That is, each division has a well-defined choice rule that selects from any given set of alternatives and a capacity. In some applications, choice rules are induced 1 from a strict ranking of alternatives. In many others, the choices are more complicated and cannot be generated so easily. To make it precise, consider a choice rule that selects applicants on the basis of their merit scores but also requires that the division select a minimum number of disabled applicants whenever possible. Such a choice rule is obviously not a responsive choice rule.
Moreover, in many real-world institutions, there are cross-division constraints, in the sense that the number of available positions in a division might depend on the number of applicants hired by other divisions. For example, consider a business school whose departments-economics, finance, marketing, etc.-are in the job market to hire new faculty. Suppose that the finance group hires first, followed by the economics department, which is then followed by the marketing department. The number of available positions for the marketing group might be increased if either the finance or the economics department hire fewer new faculty than what they initially planned, provided that the total budget of the business school is not exceeded.
In this paper, we study a many-to-one matching with contracts that incorporates a theory of choice of institutions that are composed of divisions. We formulate a new and practical family of choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions. Each institution has a total capacity, i.e., a number of available positions, and a pre-specified linear order at which it fills its divisions. Each division is endowed with a choice rule, i.e., a sub-choice rule. Each sub-choice rule has two inputs: the set of available options and its (dynamic) capacity. For each division, both of the inputs depend on the choices made by the divisions that precede it. The set of available options can be thought of as the set of remaining options from the choices of divisions that precede it. The dynamic capacity of each division is a function of the number of unfilled seats of the divisions that precede it given by an exogenously specified capacity transfer function. The overall choice rule of an institution is then defined as the union its divisions' sub-choice rules. The collection of these sub-choice rules and the capacity transfer scheme identify an overall choice rule.
We impose three conditions on sub-choice rules: Substitutability, size monotonicity and quota monotonicity. A choice rule is substitutable if no two alternatives x and y are complementary, in the sense that gaining access to x makes y desirable. A choice rule is size monotonic if it chooses weakly more alternatives whenever the set of available alternatives expands. A choice rule satisfies quota monotonicity if the following conditions hold: (1) If there is an increase in capacity, then the choice rule selects every alternative it chose beforehand, given any set of alternatives, and (2) If the capacity of a division increases by κ, then the difference between the number of alternatives chosen under increased capacity and the initial capacity cannot exceed κ. There are many non-responsive choice rules that are crucial for real-world applications and satisfy these three conditions 2 . One such family of choice rules in GLCR is introduced in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), in the context of matching problems in India with complex reservation constraints. We impose a mild condition, monotonicity, on capacity transfer functions, à la Westkamp (2013) . The monotonicity condition requires that (1) whenever weakly more seats are left unfilled in every division preceding the j th division, weakly more slots should be available for the j th division, and (2) an institution cannot decrease its total capacity in response to increased demand in some divisions. Our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), introduces several such monotonic capacity transfer functions in the context of comprehensive affirmative action constraints in college admissions and public sector job hiring in India.
We show how markets with generalized lexicographic choice rules can be cleared by the cumulative offer mechanism (COM). To illustrate this, we borrowed the novel observability theory of . We prove that when sub-choice rules satisfy substitutability, size monotonicity, and quota monotonicity, and when the capacity transfer functions are monotonic, then the overall choice rules of institutions satisfies: the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition (Proposition 1), the observable substitutability (Proposition 2), the observable size monotonicity (Proposition 3), and the non-manipulation via contractual terms (Proposition 4).
Our first main result, Theorem 1, follows by the characterization result of . The authors show that when choice rules of institutions are observably substitutable, observably size monotonic and non-manipulable via contractual terms, the COM is the unique mechanism which is stable and strategy-proof (for agents). Therefore, in marketplaces in which institutions' choice rules can be modeled, as in the GLCR family, the COM is the uniquely stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
We define a choice-based notion of improvement. We say that a choice rule of a division is an improvement over another choice rule for an individual if (1) whenever the latter choice rule selects an individual's contract, the former selects a contract (not necessarily the same contract) from her as well, and (2) when no contract of the individual is selected by either of the choice rules, then both choice rules select the same set. We extend this improvement notion to institutions' choice rules by requiring that conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied for every division. Our second main result states that the COM respects improvements. This result has important implications for real-world applications.
Finally, we note that the generality of our framework enables novel market design applications. The GLCR family via the COM offers a satisfactory solution to many practical real-world assignment problems. We present one such application in our companion paper Aygün and Turhan (2019b) in the context of comprehensive affirmative action in India for admission to publicly funded edicational institutions and government sponsored jobs. However, we believe that the theory we develop in this paper might help to design centralized marketplaces beyond the Indian case.
Practical Applications

College Admission and Government Job Recruitment in India
India has been using one of the most comprehensive affirmative action policies in the world for decades. This policy is embedded in its constitution. There are two types of reservations in India: vertical (also called social ) and horizontal (also called special ) reservations 3 . Vertical reservations have been provided as a level playing field for historically disadvantaged castes and tribes. At each institution, certain fractions of available seats are reserved for people from Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC). The remaining members of society are collectively categorized under the General Category (GC) 4 . Within each vertical category, horizontal reservations are implemented for specific groups, such as disabled people, women, people from hill areas, etc. For each horizontal reservation category, a certain minimum number of such individuals must be admitted within each vertical category. Each vertical category in an institution can be modeled as a division in our framework.
Two recents papers, Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a&b), study affirmative action in India with comprehensive affirmative action. The authors formulate the complex Indian affirmative action constraints and introduce "vertical" and "horizontal" reservations terminology. Sönmez and Yenmez (2019a) formulate shortcomings of the choice procedure given in the Supreme Court judgement in Anil Kumar Gupta vs. State of U. P. (1995), and document that these shortcomings are the main cause of numerous lawsuits in India. The authors provide an alternative choice rule to resolve these shortcomings.
Aygün and Turhan (2019b) formulates a sub-choice function for divisions that respects merit scores while also satisfying horizontal reservations. We show that these non-responsive sub-choice rules are substitutable, size monotonic, and quota monotonic. We design different monotonic capacity transfer functions depending on the application in India. Therefore, following the theory developed in this paper, we show that the COM can satisfactorily clear several different two-sided many-to-one matching markets in India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints. Our approach in Aygün and Turhan (2019b) is sharply different than Sönmez and Yenmez 's (2019a&b) approach. In particular, we consider • applicants' preferences not only over institution but also over vertical category they are admitted under 5 , and
• reverting unfilled OBC seats to GC, which is also called OBC de-reservation.
Therefore, the theory we developed in this paper allows us to formulate in the Indian affirmative action problem in its full generality. In 2008, the Japanese government introduced a regional cap that restricts the total number of medical resident matches within each of the 47 prefectures, in order to regulate the geographical distributions of doctors. Each prefecture consists of multiple hospitals. Prefectures can be modeled as institutions, and hospitals in a prefecture can be modeled as divisions of the institution. In Japan, hospitals' (divisions') sub-choice rules are responsive. Hence, the axioms we imposed on sub-choice rules are trivially satisfied. Depending on the specific government goals, monotonic capacity transfer schemes among hospitals in the same prefecture can be formulated so that the COM performs satisfactorily.
Regional Quotas in
Related Literature
The matching problem with generalized lexicographic choice rules is a special case of the matching with contracts model of Fleiner (2003) and Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) . Fleiner (2003) 6 introduced a matching model with contracts in which institutions are allowed to select multiple contracts with a given agent. Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) assume a substitutes condition, which was later weakened by Hatfield and Kojima (2010) , who maintained the stability and strategy-proofness of the COM.
Hatfield et al. (2019) characterize when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible in many-to-one matching setting with contracts. The authors introduce three novel conditions-observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulability via contractual terms-and show that when these conditions are satisfied, the COM is the unique mechanism that is stable and strategy-proof (for agents). Moreover, they show that their three conditions are necessary in the following sense: When the choice rule of some institution fails any of their three conditions, they can construct unit-demand choice rules for the other institutions, such that no stable and strategy-proof mechanism exists. We utilize their observability theory in the following sense: Each choice rule in the GLCR class satisfies observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulation via contractual terms conditions of , as well as the irrelevance of rejected contracts in Aygün and Sönmez (2013) . Hence, following their characterization result, the COM is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism in our environment.
The closest paper to ours is Hatfield et al. (2017) . The authors show how to model institutions' choices with cross-division constraints using the framework of matching with contracts. Cross-division constraints introduce new complexities that render prior approaches to proving stability and strategy-proofness inapplicable, including the approaches found in , the authors are able to show that stable and strategy-proof matching is possible in the presence of cross-division constraints. They introduce a model of institutional choice in which each institution has a set of divisions, as in our setting, and flexible allotment capacities that vary as a function of the set of contracts available. Each institution is modeled as having an allotment function that determines how many positions are allocated to each division, given the set of available contracts. Our capacity transfer functions are different than their allotment functions with respect to their very definitions and the assumptions imposed.
Aygün and Turhan (2019a) study a model of dynamic reserves that is similar to the lexicographic choice rules considered in this paper. However, the sub-choice rules are q-responsiv e in their setting, whereas in the GLCR family the sub-choices might not be q-responsive. Hence, the model of Aygün and Turhan (2019a) cannot accommodate the matching problems in India with both vertical and horizontal reservations, even though it can accommodate the matching problems with vertical reservations only.
Our paper is related to Afacan (2017) . The author is the first to define a choice-based improvement notion. We also define a choice-based improvement notion in the absence of priorities. We adapt his notion for overall choice rules to our sub-choice rules. The difference between his notion and ours is critical, because he assumes that overall choice rules satisfy unilateral substitutability, size monotonicity, and the irrelevance of rejected contracts conditions. Both the unilateral substitutability and size monotonicity of overall choice rules might be violated in our setting. His analysis-to show that the COM respects improvements-relies on the existence of the agent-optimal stable matching while ours-our proof for Theorem 2-does not.
Our paper is also related to the research agenda on matching with constraints studied in a series of papers: . In these papers, constraints are imposed on subsets of institutions as a joint restriction, as opposed to being imposed at each institution. A leading example in these papers is the medical matching problem in Japan, in which the government imposes regional caps, that serve as upper bounds on the number of doctors that can be placed in each region of the country.
Our paper also contributes to the matching-theoretical school choice literature initiated by Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (2003) , in which the authors introduced a simple affirmative action policy with type-specific quotas. Kojima (2012) investigates the consequences of affirmative action policy with type-specific quotas on students' welfare. The author provides examples in which all minority students are made worse off under this type of affirmative action. To circumvent inefficiencies caused by majority quotas, Hafalır et al. (2013) offer minority reserves. Echenique and Yenmez (2015) characterize choice rules for schools that regard students as substitutes while expressing preferences for a diverse student body.
Lexicographic choice rules are also studied in Alva (2016), Kominers and Sönmez (2016), Chambers and Yenmez (2018), and Doğan et al. (2018) among others. Alva (2016) formulates institutional choice functions that are lexicographic. The author analyzes the relationship between the properties imposed on divisions' choice rules and that of institutions' overall choice rule. Chambers and Yenmez (2018) consider lexicographic choice rules from an axiomatic perspective. They show that lexicographic choice rules satisfy acceptance and path independence, and that there are path independent choice rules that are not lexicographic. Doğan et al. (2018) provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanism that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure. Our focus on cross-division constraints while designing the GLCR family and analyzing choice-based improvement notion in our setting differentiate our work from these papers.
Matching with Contracts Setting
There is a finite set of agents I = {i 1 , ..., i n } and a finite set of institutions S = {s 1 , ..., s m }. There is a finite set of contracts X . Each contract x ∈ X is associated with an agent i(x) and an institution s(x). There may be many contracts for each agent-institution pair. We call a set of contracts X ⊆ X an outcome, with i(X) ≡ ∪ For any i ∈ I ∪ S, we let
Each agent i ∈ I has unit demand over contracts in X i and an outside option ∅ i . The strict preference of agent i over
Agent preferences over contracts are extended preferences over outcomes in the natural way.
Each institution s ∈ S has multi-unit demand and is endowed with a choice rule C s that describes how s would choose from any offered set of contracts. We let q s denote the physical capacity of institution s. We assume throughout that for all X ⊆ X and for all s ∈ S, the choice rule C s (1) only selects contracts to which s is a party, i.e., C s (X) ⊆ X s , and (2) selects at most one contract with any given agent and selects at most q s contracts, i.e., C s (X) is feasible.
For any X ⊆ X and s ∈ S, we denote by R s (X) ≡ X \ C s (X) the set of contracts that s rejects from X.
Stability
Stability requires that neither agents nor institutions wish to unilaterally walk away from their assignments, and that agents and institutions cannot benefit by recontracting outside of the match.
Mechanisms
A mechanism M(·; C) maps preference profiles P = (P i ) i∈I to outcomes, given a profile of institutional choice rules C = (C s ) s∈S . Unless otherwise stated, we assume that the choice rules of the institutions are fixed and write M(P ) in place of M(P ; C).
A mechanism M is stable if M(P ) is a stable outcome for every preference profile P . A mechanism M is strategy-proof if for every preference profile P and for each agent i ∈ I,
Cumulative offer mechanisms constitute a particularly important class of mechanisms. In a cumulative offer mechanism, C , agents propose contracts according to a strict ordering of the elements of X . In every step, some agent who does not currently have a contract held by any institution proposes his most preferred contract that has not yet been proposed. Then, each institution chooses its most preferred set of contracts according to its choice rule and holds this set until the next step. When multiple agents are able to propose in the same step, the agent who actually proposes is determined by the ordering . The mechanism terminates when no agent is able to propose; at that point, each institution is assigned the set of contracts it is holding. (We describe cumulative offer mechanisms formally in Appendix B.)
Institutions' Choice Rules for Stable and Strategy-Proof
Matching
In their novel analysis, Hatfield et al. (2019) characterized the conditions for institutional choice rules to guarantee the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms. They also showed that when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible, the outcome of any such mechanism coincides with that of a cumulative offer mechanism. Moreover, the outcomes of all cumulative offer mechanisms coincide.
In their seminal work, Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) showed that the substitutes and size monotonicity of institutions' choice rules are sufficient 7 for stable and strategy-proof matching in many-to-one matching settings with contracts. A choice rule is substitutable if no two contracts x and y are "complementary" in the sense that gaining access to x makes y desirable. Formally, a choice rule C s satisfies substitutability if for all x, y ∈ X and
Substitutability is the monotonicity of the rejection function: C s is substitutable if and only if we have R s (X) ⊆ R s (Y ) for all sets of contracts X and Y such that X ⊆ Y . The choice rule of institution s ∈ S is size monotonic 8 if s chooses weakly more contracts whenever the set of available contracts expands. That is, C s is size monotonic if for all contracts x ∈ X and sets of contracts X ⊆ X , we have | C s (X) |≤| C s (X ∪ {x} |. Substitutable and size monotonic choice rules satisfy the IRC condition. A choice rule C s satisfies the IRC if for all X ⊂ X and showed that for a cumulative offer mechanism to be stable and strategy-proof, substitutability and size monotonicity need only hold during the running of the mechanism itself. However, in that case, we also need to rule out intra-institutional manipulation. Following their terminology, we will give definitions for three properties that, if satisfied, guarantee the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We first introduce necessary concepts. An offer process for a given institution s ∈ S, with choice rule C s , is a finite sequence of distinct contracts (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x M ), such that for all m = 1, ..., M , x m ∈ X s . We say that an offer process ( 
In other words, if (x 1 , ..., x m ) is an observable offer process, choice rule C s satisfies observable substitutability if in an economy where s is the only institution no contract that is rejected at step m − 1 of the cumulative offer process is accepted at step m. This condition weakens the usual substitutability condition by requiring the set of rejected contracts to expand only at sets of contracts that can be observed in the cumulative offer process. Proposition 3 of Hatfield et al. (2019) indicates that if the choice function of every institution is observably substitutable, then for every preference profile P and any two orderings and , C (P ) = C (P ). This implies that all cumulative offer mechanisms are equivalent, i.e., the cumulative offer process is equivalent to the deferred acceptance mechanism described by Gale and Shapley (1962) .
Another important observation of is that if choice rule of every institution is observably substitutable and mechanism M is stable and strategy-proof, then for any preference profile P , M is equivalent to the cumulative offer mechanism. This implies that if the choice rules of all institutions satisfy observable substitutability, and we want to prove that a strategy-proof mechanism exists, it is enough to focus on the cumulative offer process, as it is the only candidate. The authors also find that if the choice function of each institution is observably substitutable, then for any preference profile P , the cumulative offer process is stable.
Another desirable property of the cumulative offer mechanism is strategy-proofness for agents. Without it, it is a complicated mechanism for participating agents. Even if the mechanism is stable with respect to the reported preferences, it may no longer be stable for the true preferences. However, observable substitutability is not enough to guarantee strategy-proofness-for this, two other properties, which are defined below, are required. 
In other words, observable size monotonicity requires that the size of the accepted set of contracts weakly increases along observable offer processes. This condition weakens the usual size monotonicity condition in that it only has to be satisfied by observable offer processes. 
In other words, a choice rule C s satisfies the non-manipulability via contractual terms condition if no agent i ∈ I can profit from reporting a non-truthful preference relation that only finds contracts with s acceptable.
Cumulative Offer Algorithm
The cumulative offer algorithm, which is the generalization of the agent-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) , is the central allocation mechanism used in the matching with contracts framework. We now introduce the cumulative offer process for matching with contracts. Here, we provide an intuitive description of this algorithm; we give a more technical statement in Appendix B.
In the cumulative offer process, agents propose contracts to institutions in a sequence of steps l = 1, 2, ... :
Step 1:
Some agent i 1 ∈ I proposes his most-preferred contract,
; these are the sets of contracts available to institutions at the beginning of Step 2.
Step 2:
Some agent i 2 ∈ I, for whom no contract is currently held by any institution, proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected,
and rejects all other contracts in A 2 s(x 2 ) ∪{x 2 }; institutions s = s(x 2 ) continue to hold all contracts they held at the end of Step 1. Set
Step l: Some agent i l ∈ I, for whom no contract is currently held by any institution, proposes his most-preferred contract that has not yet been rejected,
. If at any time no agent is able to propose a new contract-that is, if all agents for whom no contracts are on hold have proposed all contracts they find acceptable-then the algorithm terminates. The outcome of the cumulative offer process is the set of contracts held by institutions at the end of the last step before termination.
In the cumulative offer process, agents propose contracts sequentially. Institutions accumulate offers, choosing a set of contracts at each step (according to C s ) to hold from the set of all previous offers. The process terminates when no agent wishes to propose a contract.
Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules
We now introduce a model of institutional choice in which each institution has a set of divisions and dynamic capacities for those divisions that vary as a function of the number of unused slots in the preceding divisions. We model an institution s as having a set of divisions K s = {1, ..., K s }. Each division k ∈ K s has an associated sub-choice rule C s k : 2 X × Z ≥0 −→ 2 Xs that specifies the contracts division k chooses given a set of offers and a dynamic capacity to fill them. We require that each division k never chooses more contracts than its dynamic capacity, i.e., for a set of contracts Y ⊆ X s and a dynamic capacity of κ, we must have | C s k (Y ; κ) |≤ κ. The choice procedure is lexicographic. Institution s starts filling positions in division 1. It then fills positions in division 2, and so on and so forth. We let q s 1 be the given capacity of division 1. Given a set of contracts Y ≡ Y 1 ⊆ X and its given capacity q s 1 , C s 1 (Y 1 ; q s 1 ) denotes the set of chosen contracts by division 1. We let r 1 = q s 1 − | C s 1 (Y ; q s 1 ) | be the number of remaining slots in division 1. The dynamic capacity of division 2 is then defined as q s 2 = q s 2 (r 1 ). We remove every agent's contract that was chosen by division 1 for the rest of the procedure. Given the set of remaining contracts Y 2 and its dynamic capacity q s 2 , division 2 chooses C s 2 (Y 1 ; q s 2 (r 1 )). We let
| be the number of vacant slots from division 2. In general, given the number of vacant slots r 1 , r 2 , ..., r k−1 , the dynamic capacity of division k is given by q s k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ). Given the set remaining contracts Y k and its dynamic capacity q s k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ), division k chooses C s k (Y k ; q s k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 )). We let
.., r k−1 )) | be the number of vacant slots from division k. All the remaining contracts of agents whose contracts chosen by division k is removed from Y k for the rest of the procedure. 9 Given an initial capacity of the first division q 1 s , a capacity transfer scheme of institution s is a sequence of capacity functions q s = (q s 1 , (q s k ) Ks k=2 ), where q s k : Z k−1 + −→ Z + for all k ∈ K s and such that q s 1 + q s 2 (0) + q s 3 (0, 0) + · · · + q s K (0, ..., 0) = q s . We also impose a mild condition on capacity transfer functions, à la Westkamp (2013). A capacity transfer scheme q s is monotonic if, for all j ∈ {2, ..., K s } and all pairs of sequences (r l , r l ), such that r l ≥ r l for all l ≤ j − 1, q j s ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 ) ≥ q j s (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ), and
Monotonicity of capacity transfer schemes requires that (1) whenever weakly more seats are left unfilled in every division preceding the j th division, weakly more slots should be available for the j th division, and (2) an institution cannot decrease total capacity in response to increased demand in some divisions.
The tuple I, S, P, (C s k (·, ·), q s ) s∈S,k∈Ks denotes a problem. Note that the collection of sub-choice rules together with a capacity transfer function fully identify the overall choice rule and are hence regarded as the primitives of the model.
Conditions on Divisions' Sub-Choice Rules
We impose three conditions on divisions' sub-choice rules: Substitutability (S), size monotonicity (SM), and quota monotonicity (QM).
We already defined substitutability and size monotonicity in Section 3. We now introduce quota monotonicity.
QM requires choice rules to satisfy two conditions. First, given any set of contracts, if there is an increase in the capacity, we require the choice rule to select every contract it was choosing before increasing its capacity. It might choose some additional contracts. Second, if the capacity of a division increases by κ, then the difference between the number of contracts chosen with the increased capacity and the initial capacity cannot exceed κ.
Our first result relates the three conditions imposed on the sub-choice rules to the IRC that is satisfied by the overall choice rule in the GLCR family. Note that Proposition 1 does not refer to the monotonicity of the capacity transfer functions. That is, Proposition 1 holds even when the capacity transfer functions fail the monotonicity property. In the proof of Proposition 1, it can be seen that sub-choice rules that satisfy the IRC condition are sufficient for the overall choice rule to satisfy the IRC under any given capacity transfer function. Notice that the substitutability and size monotonicity of a choice rule imply the IRC condition (Aygün and Sönmez, 2013) .
Our next result, Proposition 2, relates three conditions imposed on the sub-choice rules together with monotonicity of the capacity transfer functions to the observable substitutability of the overall choice rule.
Proposition 2. Suppose that every division's sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM. If the capacity transfer scheme is monotonic, then the institution's overall choice rule is observably substitutable.
From the results of we know that the COM is stable when the choice rule of every institution satisfies the observable substitutability. Another desirable property of allocation mechanisms is strategy-proofness for agents. However, observable substitutability is not sufficient to guarantee strategy-proofness of the cumulative offer mechanism. For this, we need to show that choice rules in the GLCR family satisfy observable size monotonicity and non-manipulation via contractual terms. We are now ready to present our first main result. Theorem 1. Suppose that every division's sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM at each institution. If the capacity transfer scheme of each institution is monotonic, then the COM is stable and strategy-proof.
Theorem 1 is useful for practical real-life applications, as it states that a stable and strategy-proof matching mechanism is possible under the GLCR family of institutional choice. The design of different mechanisms for matching problems in India in Aygün and Turhan (2019b), both for college admissions and job matching in the government sector via vertical and horizontal reservations, utilizes Theorem 1.
Respect for Improvements
Respect for improvement is an attractive property of matching mechanisms. In some settings, especially in meritocratic systems, it is rather crucial. The property is first defined by Balinski and Sönmez (1999) in a priority-based setting. The authors showed that deferred acceptance respects improvements in the sense that making one student more highly ranked in schools' priority rankings improves their deferred acceptance outcome. In the matching with contracts setting, Sönmez and Switzer (2013), Sönmez (2013), and Kominers and Sönmez (2016) introduce choice rule specific improvement notions in the presence of ranking lists. In our setting, we may not have ranking lists. As opposed to these papers, we define a notion of improvement over choice rules regardless of the presence of a ranking list. This choice-based improvement notion was first introduced by Afacan (2017) for overall choice rules.
Definition 5. A sub-choice rule of division k at institution s C s k (·; ·) is an improvement over C s k (·; ·) for agent i if, for any set of contracts X ⊆ X and for any integer κ ∈ Z + , the following hold:
The first condition states that if a contract of agent i is chosen from a given set under the sub-choice rule C s k , then a contract of the same agent (not necessarily the same one) must be chosen under C s k given that division k has the same capacity under both sub-choice rules. It is important to note here that it is not a problem if agent i prefers x over y. As the cumulative offer algorithm is run, agents make offers in decreasing order of their preferences. If agent i offers y at some point, it means that x was rejected in earlier steps. show that renegotiation does not take place during a cumulative offer process if institutions' choice rules satisfy observable substitutability. We assume that sub-choice rules satisfy S, SM, and QM. We also assume that capacity transfer functions are monotonic. Thus, by our Proposition 2, institutional overall choice rules are observably substitutable. The second condition states that if no contract of agent i is chosen from a given set under both C s k and C s k , then the chosen sets are the same, given that division k has the same capacity under choice rules C s k and C s k . This improvement notion in conjunction with QM imply the following: If x ∈ C s k (X; κ) such that i(x) = i, then y ∈ C s k (X; κ ) for some y ∈ X, such that i(y) = i for any κ ≥ κ. Note that QM requires that when the capacity increases, the choice rule selects a superset of the set it was selecting beforehand.
Consider two overall choice rules C s and C s for institution s. Each rule takes the same monotonic capacity transfer function q s as input and both of their sub-choice rules satisfy properties S, SM, and QM. We say that an overall choice rule C s is an improvement over C s for agent i if C s k (·; ·) is an improvement over C s k (·; ·) for agent i at each division k = 1, ..., K s . Finally, we say that C ≡ ( C s ) s∈S is an improvement over C ≡ (C s ) s∈S for agent i if C s is an improvement over C s for agent i at each institution s ∈ S. Definition 6. Mechanism ϕ respects improvements if for any problem (P, C) and C such that C = ( C s k (·; ·), q s ) s∈S,k∈Ks is an improvement over C = (C s k (·; ·), q s ) s∈S,k∈Ks for agent i where sub-choice rules ( C s k (·; ·)) Ks k=1 and (C s k (·; ·)) Ks k=1 satisfy S, SM, and QM at each institution s ∈ S and capacity transfer schemes (q s ) s∈S are all monotonic, ϕ(P, C)R i ϕ(P, C).
We are now ready to present our second main result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that at each institution divisions' sub-choice rules satisfy S, SM, and QM and capacity transfer function is monotonic. Then, the COM respects improvements.
Theorem 2 has significant implications in real-world applications where a meritocratic system is integrated with affirmative action constraints, such as the matching problems in India with vertical and horizontal reservations. Aygün and Turhan (2019b) design choice rules for divisions for matching problems in India with these constraints by taking meritocratic component into account. The meritocratic sub-choice rule that takes horizontal reservations into account we propose is not q-responsive. Yet, we show that it satisfies S, SM, and QM. Moreover, the capacity transfer functions in India-for transferring otherwise vacant OBC slots to others-is shown to be monotonic in our setting. Hence, the COM respects improvements in regards to our design.
An important implication of respecting improvements in the case of Indian college admissions and job matching problems is that it incentivizes applicants to declare all horizontal reservation types they have.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a new and practical family of choice rules motivated by real-life institutional allocation and choice problems. Institutions are divided into divisions where each division is endowed with a choice rule that satisfies S,SM, and QM. Interaction between divisions, in the sense of capacity transfers, are allowed. The capacity transfer functions are assumed to be monotonic. The overall choice rule of an institution is then defined as the union of its divisions' sub-choices. The paper proves that each such choice rule satisfies the three novel conditions introduced by Hatfield et al. (2019), namely, observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity and non-manipulation via contractual terms, together with the irrelevance of rejected contracts condition of Aygün and Sönmez (2013) . As a result, in many-to-one matching frameworks, the COM, with respect to such overall choice rules, becomes stable and strategy-proof. We define a choice-based notion of improvement and show that the COM respects improvements. This result has important implications for real-world applications.
Our results can be used to design practical marketplaces. One such example is shown in our companion paper, Aygün and Turhan (2019b), in the context of matching problems in India that implement comprehensive affirmative action constraints, i.e., vertical and horizontal affirmative action constraints. In our companion paper, we define a sub-choice rule that satisfies S, SM, and QM. The sub-choice rule we designed considers additional policy goals that are specific to India. The design also includes monotonic capacity transfer functions, so that the COM appears as the unique stable and strategy-proof matching mechanism. Our construction can be used not only for college admissions under constraints in India but also in job matching processes for government-sponsored job recruitments. The COM also respects improvements which has significant implications for the Indian case. We believe the theory we developed in this paper will find other attractive real-life applications beyond India.
Appendix
A. Formal Description of the Generalized Lexicographic Choice Procedure Given a set contracts Y ≡ Y 1 ⊆ X , a capacity q s for institution s, and a capacity q s 1 for division 1, we compute the chosen set C s (Y ; q s ) in K steps where division 1 chooses in step 1, division 2 chooses in step 2, and so on and so forth.
Step 1 Given Y 1 and q s 1 , division 1 chooses C s
Step k (2 ≤ k ≤ K): Given the set of remaining contracts Y k and its dynamic capac- . .., r k−1 ))]}. The union of divisions' choices is the institution's chosen set, i.e., . .., r k−1 )).
B. Formal Description of the Cumulative Offer Process
The cumulative offer process associated with proposal order Γ is the following algorithm 1. Let l = 0. For each s ∈ S, let D 0 s ≡ ∅, and A 1 s ≡ ∅.
2. For each l = 1, 2, ... 
Return the outcome
which consists of contracts held by institutions at the point when no agents want to propose additional contract.
Here, the sets D l−1 s and A l s denote the set of contracts held by and available to institution s at the beginning of the cumulative offer process step l. We say that a contract z is rejected during the cumulative offer process if z ∈ A l s(z) but z / ∈ D l−1 s(z) for some l.
C. Proofs
Before we prove the results, we first introduce some notation:
• If X M = {x 1 , ..., x M } is an observable offer process, we say X m = {x 1 , .., x m }, i.e., X m are the contracts proposed up to step m of the observable offer process X M .
• H k (X m ) denotes the set of contracts available to division k in the computation of C s (X m ).
is the set of all contracts that were available to division k at some point of offer process X m = {x 1 , ..., x m }.
• q m−1 k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) is the dynamic capacity of division k at step m − 1 of the observable offer process and q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) is the dynamic capacity of division k at step m of the observable offer process.
• R k (X m ; q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) is the set of contracts rejected by division k at step m of the observable offer process X m .
We first prove the following lemma which will be key for proving our results. 
.., r k−1 )).
Proof of Lemma 1
We use mathematical induction on pairs (m, k) ordered in the following way:
(1, 1), (1, 2) , ..., (1, K), (2, 1), (2, 2), ..., (2, K), ..., (M, 1), (M, 2), ..., (M, K).
Initial Step:
Consider m = 1 and any division k = 1, ..., K. Note that X m−1 = X 0 = ∅ and X 1 = {x 1 }. Since H k (X 0 ) = H k (∅) = ∅, condition (1) holds trivially because ∅ ⊆ H k (X 1 ) for all k = 1, ..., K. Condition (2) also holds because it reduces to C k (F k (X 1 ) ⊆ H k (X 1 ) = F k (X 1 ). Condition (3) also holds trivially since H k (X 1 ) = F k (X 1 ). Condition (4) holds at the pair (1, 1) as for the first division the initial capacity is given exogenously, i.e., q s 1 . Condition (5) reduces to R k (∅) = ∅ ⊆ R k (F k (X 1 )) and it trivially holds.
Inductive assumption: Assume that conditions (1)-(5) hold for
• every (m , k) with m < m and k = 1, ..., K,
• every (m, k ) with k < k.
We need to show that conditions (1)-(5) hold for the pair (m, k). We start with condition (1).
(1) Take z ∈ C k (H k (X m−1 ); q m−1 k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 )). If z is chosen by division k, then it must have been rejected by all divisions that precede it. Hence, we have
By inductive assumptions (2) and (3), for all k < k, we have
Note that all the contracts of agent i(z) are in H k (X m−1 ) for all k < k.
Hence,
Hence, we conclude that R k (F k (X m−1 ); q m−1 k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) ⊆ R k (F k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )).
(2) By the definition of choice rules, we have C k (F k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) ⊆ F k (X m ). We can decompose F k (X m ) as follows: . .., r k−1 )) by definition. If we replace R k (F k (X m−1 )) by R k (F k (X m )) and use the fact that R k (F k (X m−1 )) ⊆ R k (F k (X m )) by (5), then we have
But, by definition, C k (F k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) ∩ R k (F k (X m )) = ∅. Hence, the above inclusion relation can be written as
By (1) we have C k (H k (X m−1 ); q m−1 k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) ⊆ H k (X m ). Then, combining (1) and (2) gives us C k (F k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) ⊆ H k (X m ).
Hence, since the sub-choice rules satisfy the IRC, we can conclude that C k (H k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) = C k (F k (X m ); q m k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )).
Proof of Proposition 1 Take a set of contracts Y ⊆ X and a contract z ∈ X \ Y , such that z / ∈ C s (Y ∪ {z}; q s ). We need to prove that C s (Y ; q s ) = C s (Y ∪ {z}; q s ). Before starting our proof, note that the substitutability and size monotonicity of divisions' sub-choice rules imply they satisfy the IRC.
Consider two different choice processes for institution s: one starts with Y and one starts with Y ∪ {z}. Let Y j and Y j denote the set of contracts division j receives under choice processes starting with Y and Y ∪ {z}, respectively. Note that
Let r j and r j denote the number of vacant seats at division k in the choice processes starting with Y and Y ∪ {z}, respectively.
Consider division 1. Under both choice processes, the given capacity of division 1 is the same, i.e., q s
Since the sub-choice rule of division 1 satisfies the IRC, we have that C s 1 (Y ∪ {z}; q s 1 ) = C s 1 (Y ; q s 1 ). We also have that r 1 = r 1 since
Inductive assumption: Suppose that for all divisions j = 1, ..., k − 1 we have that C s j (Y j ; q s j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) = C s j ( Y j ; q s j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )). We will now prove that for division k we have that
The inductive assumption implies that for all j = 1, ..., k − 1 we have r j = r j . Hence, we have that q s k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) = q s k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ).
Since z / ∈ C s (Y ∪ {z}; q s ), we have that z / ∈ C s k ( Y k ; q s k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )).
Note that the inductive assumption also implies that Y k ≡ Y k ∪ {z}. By the IRC property of the sub-choice rules, we have that C s k (Y k ; q s k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) = C s k ( Y k ; q s k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )).
Proof of Proposition 2 Consider an institution s ∈ S and observable offer process
. Since y is rejected by institution s when s faces the offer process X M −1 , it must be rejected by all divisions k = 1, ..., K. Let r k and r k denote the number of unfilled seats of division k for the choice processes starting with X M −1 and X M , respectively. Hence, for all k = 1, ..., K, we have that
Since the sub-choice rules of divisions satisfy substitutability, we have that . .., r k−1 )).
for all k = 1, ..., K. By (5) of Lemma 1, we have that
for each division k = 1, ..., K. This implies that
for each division k = 1, ..., K. Therefore, . .., r k−1 )).
By (3) of Lemma 1, we have that . .., r k−1 )).
Hence, we have that y / ∈ C s k (H k (X M ); q M k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 )) for all k = 1, ..., K. Thus, under the choice procedure that defines C s , we have that y / ∈ R s (X M ), as desired.
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an institution s ∈ S and observable offer processes
., x M } for s. Let r k and r k be the number of unfilled slots of division k under choice procedures starting with the observable offer processes X M −1 and X M , respectively. Let H k (X M −1 ) and H k (X M ) denote the sets of contracts division k faces under the choice procedures starting with X M −1 and X M , respectively.
are the set of all contracts available to division k at some point of offer process X M −1 = {x 1 , ..., x M −1 } and X M = {x 1 , ..., x M }, respectively. For the ease of notation, we let r j = (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ) and r j = ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 ) . Similarly, let r k = (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) and r k = ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ). Note that by (3) of Lemma 1 we can replace H sets with F sets as follows:
and
By (4) of Lemma 1, we know that
By the second condition of monotonic capacity transfer functions, we have
Replacing
gives us the following:
Readjusting the terms on the right and left sides gives us
By QM of sub-choice rules, we have the following:
By SM of the sub-choice rules, we also have the following:
Combining the inequalities above, we obtain
Hence, we have
Applying (3) of Lemma 1 again gives us
Since the inequality above holds for all k = 1, ..., K, we have
which is the desired conclusion.
Proposition 2 of Hatfield et al. (2019)
Suppose that C s is a choice rule for institution s ∈ S that is observably substitutable and manipulable by agent i ∈ I via contractual terms. In this case, there exists a preference profile P and preferences P i under which only contracts with s are acceptable, with P i of the form
and P i of the form
such that either
Before starting to prove Proposition 4 we will first prove a lemma and then introduce some extra notation to ease our proof.
Lemma 2. Let X m = {x 1 , ..., x m } and Y n = {y 1 , ..., y n } be two observable offer processes, such that X m ⊆ Y n . Then, for all divisions k = 1, ..., K, . .., r k−1 )), and 3. q m k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) ≥ q n k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ), where (r 1 , ..., r k ) and ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) are the vector of the number of vacant seats in choice procedures starting with offer sets X m and Y n , respectively.
Proof of Lemma 2
We proceed by mathematical induction on divisions k = 1, ..., K.
For the first division, i.e., k = 1, F 1 (X m ) ≡ X m and F 1 (Y n ) ≡ Y n by definition. Hence, we have by our assumption F 1 (X m ) ⊆ F 1 (Y n ). Thus, (1) is satisfied. Since the capacity of the first division is given, regardless of the offer set, statement (3) is trivially satisfied.
The substitutability of the sub-choice rules implies that R 1 (F 1 (X m ); q s 1 ) ⊆ R 1 (F 1 (Y n ); q s 1 ). Therefore, (2) is also satisfied for k = 1.
Inductive assumption: Suppose that (1)-(3) are satisfied for all divisions j < k.
We now need to show that (1)-(3) hold for division k.
We start by showing that (3) holds for k. By our inductive assumption (3) and QM, for all j < k, | C s j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) | − | C s j (F j (X m ); q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) |≤ q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )−q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 ).
Rearranging the terms gives us q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )− | C s j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) |≥ q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )− | C s j (F j (X m ); q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) | .
By our inductive assumption (1) and the size monotonicity, we have
which implies that r j ≥ r j for all j < k. Then, by monotonicity of capacity transfer functions, q m k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) ≥ q n k ( r 1 , ..., r k−1 ).
Hence, (3) holds for division k.
To show (1), consider z ∈ F k (X m ). There are two cases to consider:
; q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ))], for all j < k. In this case, we know that all contracts of agent i(z) are rejected by all divisions that precede division k, i.e., . .., r j−1 )).
By our inductive assumption (2), we have . .., r j−1 )), for some j < k. Then, all contracts of agent i(z) in X m are considered by some division at some n ≤ n in the choice procedure starting with Y n . Hence, we have that (X m ) i(z) ⊆ F k (Y n ). Since z ∈ F k (X m ) was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude that F k (X m ) ⊆ F k (Y n ).
2. i(z) ∈ i[C j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ))] for some j < k. Let y be the contract of agent i(z) that is chosen by some division j that precedes division k in the choice procedure starting with X m , i.e., y = [C j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ))] i(z) .
Since X m is an observable offer process and the overall choice rule of institution s, C s (·; q s ), is observably substitutable, we have
However, y / ∈ F k (X m ). Otherwise, we would contradict with the fact that y is chosen by some division j < k in the choice procedure starting with X m . Recall that as n increases, the sets F j (X n ) expand and the overall choice rules are observably substitutable.
.., r j−1 ))] for all j < k, then it means (X m ) i(z) ⊆ F k (Y n ) and the proof concludes. Otherwise, suppose that there exists some w ∈ C j (F j (Y n ); q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )) for some j < k and i(w) = i(z). Then, since Y n is an observable offer process and C s satisfies observable substitutability, we have that
and the proof concludes.
• If w = y, then (X m ) i(z) \ {y} ⊆ (Y n ) i(z) \ {w} ⊆ F k (Y n ) and the proof concludes.
• If w ∈ (X m ) i(z) \ {y}, then, by the fact that X m is an observable offer process, there must exist m < m such that w ∈ R j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 ). By the construction of the F sets, the sub-choice rules that satisfy QM and (4) of Lemma 1, we have w ∈ R j (F j (X m ); q m j (r 1 , ..., r j−1 )). By (1) and (3) of Lemma 1 and the fact that sub-choice rules satisfy substitutability, we have w ∈ R j (F j (Y n ); q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )). It contradicts w ∈ C j (F j (Y n ); q n j ( r 1 , ..., r j−1 )). Hence, w ∈ (X m ) i(z) \ {y} cannot be the case.
Some Extra Notation for the proof of Proposition 4
Consider an arbitrary agent i, and let z 0 , z 1 , ..., z L be an arbitrary sequence of contracts in X i . Fix a profile of preferences P −i for all other agents, and let P i and P i be given by
We first fix an ordering over the set of contracts X . We let X N = {x 1 , ..., x N } be the observable offer process induced by the COM with ordering under the preferences (P i , P −i ) when institution s is the only institution available. Suppose also that X = { x 1 , ..., x N } is the observable offer process induced by the COM with ordering under the preferences ( P i , P −i ) when institution s is the only institution available.
and for all divisions k = 1, ..., K we have that F k (X N ) ⊆ F k ( X N ).
Proof of Lemma 3
We proceed by mathematical induction on pairs (m, k) in the following order:
(1, 1), (1, 2), ..., (1, K), (2, 1), (2, 2), ..., (2, K), ..., (N, 1), (N, 2), ..., (N, K), and at each step we show the following:
where q m k (r 1 , ..., r k−1 ) and q N k (r 1 , ...,r k−1 ) are the dynamic capacity of division k in the choice processes starting with X m and X N , respectively.
For the base case (1, 1), it must be that x 1 is either the highest-ranked contract of some agent i(x 1 ) = i or x 1 = z 1 . In the former case, x 1 must be offered at some step of the offer process X N , as it is the best contract agent i(x 1 ) want to offer. In the latter case, since z 0 is rejected by our assumption, i must offer her second-best contract under P i , z 1 = x 1 , at some step in the offer process X N . Hence, in both cases, x 1 ∈ X N . Since F 1 ( X N ) = X N , we have that F 1 ({x 1 }) ⊆ F 1 ( X N ). Then, by substitutability of the sub-choice rules, we have that
.
We now show that both inclusion relations hold for (m, k) if they both hold for
• every pair (m , k), such that m < m and k = 1, ..., K, and
• every pair (m, k ) with k < k.
We first show that they hold for (m, 1), given that they are satisfied for every pair (m , k), such that m < m and k = 1, ..., K. By the inductive assumption for pairs (m − 1, k), we have ({x 1 , ..., x m−1 }) i(x m ) ⊆ R k (F k ( X N ); q N k (r 1 , ...,r k−1 )), for all k = 1, ..., K. By the observability of the offer process X N and the fact that it represents all the offers made under the cumulative offer process for ( P i , P −i ), there must exist some step n at which x m is proposed in X N . Recall that X N ≡ F 1 ( X N ). Therefore, we have that x m ∈ X N ≡ F 1 ( X N ). Also, by the inductive assumption for the pair (m − 1, 1), we have that X m−1 ≡ F 1 (X m−1 ) ⊆ F 1 ( X N ). Moreover, since we know that F 1 (X m ) ≡ X m = {x m } ∪ X m−1 , we have
which is the first condition we want to show for the pair (m, 1). Then, by substitutability of the sub-choice rules, we can conclude that R 1 (F 1 (X m ); q s 1 ) ⊆ R 1 (F 1 ( X N ; q s 1 ), which ends our proof for the pair (m, 1).
This completes our induction and ends the proof. To show (1), note that Lemma 3 implies that if i[C(P i , P −i )] = ∅ and z 0 / ∈ C( P i , P −i ), then R s (X N ) ⊆ R s ( X N ). Moreover, if i[C(P i , P −i )] = ∅, then {z 1 , ..., z L } ⊆ R s (X N ) and hence {z 1 , ..., z L } ⊆ R s ( X N ). Thus, i[C( P i , P −i )] = ∅.
Proof of
To show (2), first notice that by Proposition 1 of Hatfield et al. (2019) the COM is order independent, since our overall choice rules are observably substitutable and observably size monotonic. Hence, we can consider X N and X N to be generated by the cumulative offer process with respect to the same proposal ordering in which all of the agents' contracts other than i precede all of the contracts associated with i. Under this choice of , there must exist an λ such that 1. x m =x m for all m < λ, 2. x λ = z 1 , and 3.x λ = z 0 .
That is, λ is the first step of each cumulative offer process with respect to the order at which agent i proposes. The offer process X N ends with the rejection of the contract z L , since z L follows all contracts with agents other than i according to our specific ordering and the fact that i[C( P i , P −i )] = ∅. At each step after λ, exactly one contract is newly rejected, since the overall choice rule of the institution is observable substitutable and size monotonic. Formally, the following holds:
Similarly, since | R s (X m ) \ R s (X m−1 ) |= 1 for all m = λ, λ + 1, ..., N − 1, we have | C s (X N −1 ; q s ) |=| C s ( X N ; q s ) | .
But, since X N ⊆ X N , the observable size monotonicity of C s implies that | C s (X N ; q s ) |≤| C s ( X N ; q s ) | .
Therefore, we must have R s (X N ; q s ) \ R s (X N −1 ; q s ) = ∅.
Toward a contradiction, suppose that y ∈ R s (X N ; q s ) \ R s (X N −1 ; q s ) = ∅ and y = z L . Note that y is the least-preferred acceptable contract of agent i(y) with respect to P i(y) where i(y) = i. Then, Lemma 3 implies that there is some step m * ≥ λ, such that y ∈ R s ( X m * ) \ R s ( X m * −1 ). But, since | R s ( X m * ) \ R s ( X m * −1 ) |= 1 and y is the least preferred acceptable contract for i(y), the cumulative offer process for ( P i , P −i ) would end at step m * with the rejection of y. This contradicts the fact that the cumulative offer process for ( P i , P −i ) ends with the rejection of z L .
Proof of Theorem 1. By Propositions (1)-(4), the overall choice rule of each institution satisfies the IRC condition, observable substitutability, observable size monotonicity, and non-manipulation via contractual terms. Then, by Theorem 4 (Hatfield et al., 2019) , the COM is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Let Φ denote the COM. The contract agent i receives for the problem (P, C) is denoted by Φ i (P, C). Consider a problem (P, C) and C, which is an improvement over C for agent i such that each sub-choice rule satisfies S, SM, and QM under both C and C. Moreover, each institution's capacity transfer function is monotonic under both C and C. Let x and y be the contracts agent i receives under the cumulative offer processes with regards to C and C, respectively. That is, Φ i (P, C) = x and Φ i (P, C) = y.
Toward a contradiction, assume that xP i y. Note that yR i ∅ (with the possibility that y = ∅) because the cumulative offer algorithm returns an individually rational match for agents. Consider the false preference, P i , for agent i such that x is the only contract agent i. That is,
We will first show that Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = x. We prove this claim in two steps. In the first step, we will show that Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = x. Toward a contradiction, suppose that Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = ∅. Recall that Φ i (P, C) = x. Hence, agent i can report P i instead of P i and and obtain x. That means the COM is manipulable at the preference profile ( P i , P −i ). However, we established in Theorem 1 that the COM is strategy-proof. This is a contradiction. Therefore, Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = x must hold.
In the second step, we will show that Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = x. In the first step, we showed that
Recall that C is an improvement over C for agent i. Let s(x) = s. We know that the cumulative offer process is order independent. Let agent i be the last agent to propose contracts. Then, by the definition of improvements, the cumulative offer processes under choice profiles C and C are identical without agent i. Since C s is an improvement over C s for agent i, the division in institution s(x) that selects x at ( P i , P −i , C) selects x at ( P i , P −i , C), as well. Hence, we have Φ i ( P i , P −i , C) = x. Therefore, agent i has an incentive to report P i at problem (P, C). This contradicts the fact that the COM is strategy-proof under our assumptions. Thus, we must have yR i x.
